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Many of Kant’s contemporaries considered scientific inventions and discoveries as 
products of genius as well as appropriate objects of aesthetic appreciation. Consider 
Alexander Gerard’s definition of genius as the “faculty of invention; by means of which a 
man is qualified for making new discoveries, or for producing original works of art” 
(1966 [1774], 8). Or consider Francis Hutcheson’s claim that mathematical theorems and 
scientific principles, such as Newton’s law of gravitation, are beautiful (2004 [1726], 36-
42). In the Kritik der Urteilskraft, by contrast, Kant restricts genius to artistic production 
and denies that science is beautiful. “Genius,” he insists, “is a talent for art, not for 
science” (KU, AA 5:309) and “a science which, as such, is supposed to beautiful, is 
absurd” (KU, AA 5: 305).1  
 
But this was not always Kant’s view. In notes and lectures from the late 1770s and early 
1780s, he claims that both scientific and artistic invention involve genius (Wenzel 2001). 
And despite his ultimate restriction of genius to the production of beautiful art in the KU, 
several recent interpreters have even tried to find a place for genius in Kant’s account of 
cognition generally (Matherne 2015) and science specifically (Breitenbach 2018).  I think 
we should be skeptical of these recent interpretations, but I will not challenge them 
directly. Instead, my goal in this paper is to examine why Kant excludes genius from 
science in the KU. I suggest that both epistemic and moral considerations underwrite this 
exclusion. While Kant’s epistemic reasons rest on a conception of scientific practice that 
is more constrained than what we might now endorse, his broadly moral reasons, which 
rest on the role of scientific education in the development of the rational capacities of 
human beings, should be of continued interest.   
 
	
1	All	English translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.	
I.  Epistemic Reasons 
 
As John Zammito has argued, Kant’s views on genius in the KU, in particular, his 
suggestion that science cannot be beautiful, should be understood in the context of Kant’s 
criticism of his former student, Johan Gottfried Herder (Zammito 1992, 137-142). In 
1784, Herder published the first volume of Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of 
Man, which Kant reviewed (along with the second volume) in 1785. Kant was especially 
critical of Herder’s hypothesis of a creative force in nature that is responsible for the 
origin of organic life out of an initial state of chaos and for the transformation of species 
over time. But Kant does not merely object to the content of Herder’s Ideas, he is equally 
critical of Herder’s style, accusing Herder of letting his “poetical spirit…invad[e]” his 
philosophical work and of relying on “bold metaphors, poetic images, and mythological 
allusions” in order “to conceal the body of the thoughts as under a farthingale” 
(RezHerder, AA 8:60). At the end of his review, Kant remarks that he wished that Herder 
had “put his lively genius under some constraint” (RezHerder, AA 8:55). Kant is clearly 
concerned that Herder’s beautiful prose masks his fanciful and unfounded speculations. 
In the KU, Kant expresses a similar concern when he claims that if science were 
beautiful, “one would be sent packing with tasteful expressions (bon mots)” in place of 
“grounds and proofs” (KU, AA 5:305).  
  
One might be tempted to conclude that Kant’s exclusion of genius from science merely 
reflects his desire to separate the epistemic and aesthetic virtues of science. One way to 
put this proposal would be to suggest that Kant is concerned with the justification of 
scientific theories, but this is compatible with the aesthetic appreciation of theories—so 
long as aesthetic merits are not mistaken for epistemic ones—and with a role for genius 
in scientific discovery.  After all, Kant claims that science as such (als solche)—that is, as 
a systematic body of demonstrable cognitions—cannot be beautiful, but this leaves open 
the possibility that certain scientific representations also have aesthetic properties and 
that the creativity associated with genius plays a role in scientific reflection (Breitenbach 
2018).  
 
I want to suggest, however, that’s Kant exclusion of genius from science does not merely 
concern what we would now call the context of justification but extends to the context of 
discovery as well. This becomes clear if we consider Kant’s analysis of genius in the KU, 
and specifically, with the way he contrasts artistic inspiration and scientific method. In 
§§46 and 47, Kant presents an account of genius in terms of a special talent that cannot 
be learned. The process through which the genius creates her works is, moreover, one 
that even the genius cannot fully understand, let alone communicate to others. This is at 
odds with Kant’s account of the rational structure of science. He has an account of the 
constraints on hypothesis formation, which he develops in the KrV, which is 
incompatible with his account of genius.  
  
Before turning to a discussion of these constraints, it’s worth noting that Kant had earlier 
rejected an account of genius as essentially involving incommunicability. In a note dated 
from the late 1770s that is clearly directed at Johann Georg Hamann’s account of genius 
in terms of quasi-divine inspiration coupled with a disdain for rules, Kant writes that 
“[g]enius is not some sort of demon that gives out inspirations and revelations” nor is it 
“a special kind of insight; it must be able to be communicated and made understandable 
to everyone” (Refl. 899, AA 15: 393). Yet, this is how Kant characterizes genius in the 
KU. He writes that genius “cannot itself describe or indicate scientifically how it brings 
its products into being;” “the author of a product that he owes to his genius does not 
know himself how the ideas for it come to him” and thus “does not have it in his power to 
think up such things at will, or according to plan, and to communicate to others precepts 
that would put them in a position to produce similar results” (KU, AA 5:308). He then 
explicitly notes the etymological root of the term “Genie” in the Latin “genius,” which 
refers to “the particular spirit given to a person at birth, which protects and guides him, 
and from whose inspiration those original ideas stem” (KU, AA 5:308). Unlike Hamann, 
Kant does not attribute the source of these ideas to divine inspiration, but instead to 
nature (KU, AA 5:307). Nevertheless, Kant has come to accept precisely what he earlier 
denied, namely, that genius essentially involves incommunicability, at least at the level of 
creative process (Gammon 1997).  
 
This, in turn, is why Kant is keen to exclude genius from science. Scientific cognition 
must, as such, be communicable. Setting aside the anachronism of the term, there is 
probably no other “scientist” for whom he had greater respect than Isaac Newton, yet 
Kant insists that Newton is not a genius, because “everything that Newton expounded in 
his immortal work on the principles of natural philosophy, no matter how great a mind it 
took to discover it, can still be learned,” but, as Kant notes, “one cannot learn how to 
write inspired poetry” (KU, AA 5: 308). One might worry that Kant is confusing two 
different abilities here: the ability to learn what Newton has expounded, on the one hand, 
and the ability to make a similar discovery or advancement oneself, on the other. But 
even though the latter ability is distinct from the former, as it requires that one go beyond 
“what others have thought” in a way that the former does not, he still does not want to 
identify Newton’s work with that of genius, because it “lies on the natural path of inquiry 
and reflection in accordance with rules” (KU, AA 5:308). In other words, he denies a role 
for genius even at the level of scientific discovery, because he holds that the scientific 
process is no less rationally constrained than the cognition it produces.   
  
We can better appreciate this point if we recall Kant’s account of scientific methodology 
in the KrV, especially with respect to hypothesis formation. In the “The discipline of pure 
reason with regard to hypotheses,” he presents two general constraints on hypothesis 
formation in empirical scientific inquiry, which are aimed at curbing the speculative 
impulses of reason.2  First, hypotheses must accord not only with the conditions of 
possible experience, they must also accord with already known “laws of appearances,” 
i.e., with our actual cognition of empirical objects and their properties (KrV, A772/ B 
800). Second, adequate hypotheses must account for given consequences without in turn 
depending on auxiliary hypotheses (KrV, A 774/ B 802).  
  
Of course, these constraints on hypothesis formation, taken on their own, would still 
allow plenty of room for the kind of creativity associated with genius. But in the 
Appendix to the Dialectic, Kant also presents an account of how ideas of reason—
without themselves serving as explanatory hypotheses—nevertheless structure scientific 
	
2 For more discussion of these conditions, see Butts (1961).   
inquiry (Butts 1961). Although we can neither cognize the soul as a simple substance nor 
posit it as an empirical hypothesis to explain the unity of various psychological 
phenomena, the rational idea of the soul as a simple substance can nevertheless guide the 
formation of hypotheses in empirical psychology. That is, the idea of the soul as a simple 
substance directs us to try to reduce the various psychological powers to more basic 
powers, when e.g., when we try to see “if imagination combined with consciousness may 
not be memory, wit, the power to distinguish, or perhaps even understanding and reason” 
(KrV, A 649/ B 677). Kant likewise thinks that (Stahlian) chemistry is guided by rational 
ideas of the elements (e.g., pure earth, pure water, pure air), which guide systematic 
experimentation into chemical phenomena.  
  
In addition to forming the ideas around which the cognitions within particular sciences 
are organized, reason also supplies general methodological principles that rest on the 
transcendental assumption that nature itself is systematic. These are the principles of the 
homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms. The principle of homogeneity leads 
the investigator of nature to try to find higher concepts (genera) under which to subsume 
given particulars, under the assumption that despite all of the variety of nature, there is 
nevertheless sameness of kind. The principle of specification, which rests on an 
assumption of variety in nature, leads the investigator to search for further species and 
subspecies. The principle of continuity rests on the assumption that there are no leaps in 
nature and hence that there is “a graduated transition from one species to others” (KrV, A 
660/ B 688). This, in turn, leads us to suppose an affinity among objects, specifically with 
respect to their powers and properties.  
  
Kant gives an example from astronomy to illustrate how these principles guide 
hypothesis formation. As Kant sees it, the principle of continuity underlies Kepler’s 
hypothesis that the planets move in an elliptical, rather than circular orbit around the Sun. 
Kant writes, “we suppose that the movements of the planets that are not a circle will more 
or less approximate to its properties, and then we come upon the ellipse” (KrV, A 662/ B 
691). Kant then examines how all three principles operate in Newton’s generalization of 
Kepler’s laws. In line with the principle of homogeneity, circular and elliptical orbital 
paths are unified under a common genera (that of conic sections) and at the level of unity 
of causes, we subsume all of these motions under the inverse square law. But then further 
reasoning in accord with continuity and homogeneity suggests that parabolas, which are 
also conic sections, might be possible paths of bodies (comets). Finally, in line with the 
principle of specification, hyperbolas are considered as paths of objects that come by the 
sun but never return to the solar system.  
  
As this example illustrates, Kant sees scientific discovery as fundamentally shaped by 
ideas and principles of reason. This is why he claims in the KU that everything that 
Newton discovered “lies on the natural path of inquiry and reflection in accordance with 
rules” (5: 309). Because rules must come first and “determine the procedure” in scientific 
practice, there is no room for the genius who cannot “indicate how his ideas … arise and 
come together in his head” (5:308).   
 
II. Moral Reasons 
  
Kant’s reasons for excluding genius from science are not merely epistemic, but also stem 
from his views about the importance of scientific education in the development of the 
rational capacities of the human being, and thus ultimately in the development of the 
human being for her moral vocation. In the context of his teleological philosophy of 
history, where Kant is concerned with the development of reason at the level of the 
human species, he emphasizes that the pursuit of art and science stems from the unsocial 
sociability of human beings and hence from self-conceit, vanity, and the desire to seek 
ascendancy over others. Nevertheless, Kant thinks that in pursuing art and science, 
humans acquire the kind of discipline that is a necessary condition for moral action—
since moral action requires that one be able to overcome one’s sensible inclinations—and 
that they acquire the skills that allow them to pursue their ends, even if these are not yet 
moral ends (KU, AA 5:431-2). The unsocial sociability of human beings, which 
manifests in the pursuit of art and science in order to set oneself apart from others, 
ultimately serves to develop the rational capacities of the human species (Wood 1991).   
 
In his lectures on pedagogy, Kant similarly emphasizes the importance of the science and 
arts in promoting discipline and skill, but here the development of the human being is 
seen not from the perspective of nature, which uses human antagonism and inequality as 
a means to an end, but from the perspective of the education of human beings as guided 
by the “idea of humanity and its entire vocation” (Päd AA, 9:447; Munzel 2003, 60). 
“Each generation,” he writes, “is ever more able to bring about an education which 
develops all of the human being’s natural predispositions proportionally and purposively, 
thus leading the whole human species towards its vocation” (Päd AA, 9: 446). The 
purpose of education is to cultivate the powers of the mind, both the lower powers, 
including attention, memory, imagination and the higher powers, including 
understanding, judgment, and reason. Education in mathematics and the sciences, for 
Kant, is part of the cultivation of the higher powers of the mind, not only for their 
theoretical employment, but also for their practical employment. This is not just the point 
that education provides one with the self-discipline and skills that make possible the 
pursuit of various ends, but also that developing one’s rational capacities is a form of 
self-determination that paves the way for moral self-determination. He suggests a parallel 
between genuine theoretical knowledge, which the pupil possesses when she is able to 
“produce it” from herself and moral maxims, “which originate from the human being’s 
own understanding” (Päd, AA 9:477-481). Here, we should note that while Kant 
identifies learning with imitation in the KU, he understands imitation not as the mindless 
following of rules—i.e., mere copying—but as involving a consciousness of the rules. Of 
course, Kant allows that one can be well educated in various respects and “still be poorly 
cultivated in moral terms, and thus be an evil creature” (Päd, AA 9:470). Nevertheless, 
education in the sciences forms an essential part of the cultivation of the human being, 
ultimately for her moral vocation.   
  
It is in the context of his views on education that we should understand the following 
passage from the KU, where Kant is keen to emphasize that he does not mean to 
disparage great minds (such as Newton) when he denies that they are geniuses. He writes: 
   
 In their very talent for ever-advancing greater perfection of cognition and    
 all the utility that depends on it, and likewise in the education of others for    
 the acquisition of the same knowledge, lies the great advantage of such  people over those  
 who have the honor of being called geniuses (KU, AA 5:309, italics added).  
 
The figure of the genius, as a favorite of nature endowed with a special talent that can 
only be bestowed but never acquired through diligence, is at odds with a model of 
education that emphasizes the inherent rational capacities of all human beings and their 
development through the right kind of instruction. It is the model of education that Kant 
endorses when he claims that the “greatest discover” in the sciences “differs only in 
degree from the most hard working imitator and apprentice” (KU, AA 5: 309). By 
excluding genius from science, Kant not only endorses the rational structure of scientific 
discovery, he also thereby endorses a vision of science as, at least in principle, accessible 
to all. And indeed, this is precisely what we should hope if, as Kant suggests, the ultimate 
value of science lies not in its great utility for promoting contingent human interests, but 




We have seen that Kant has two reasons for rejecting that genius plays a role in science, 
one epistemic and one broadly moral.  Since Kant’s time, the popularity of accepting 
rational constraints on hypothesis formation has waxed and waned.  Logical positivists 
and Popperians alike never tired of the story of August Kekulé, who discovered the 
hypothesis of the ring shape of benzene by dreaming of a snake biting its tail, or of 
Kepler, who, pace Kant’s version of the story, constructed hypotheses about the solar 
system out of Neoplatonic mysticism. But even if one follows Popper and Reichenbach in 
rejecting the idea that hypothesis formation has a rational structure and accepts, as 
Breitenbach (2018) emphasizes, that scientific discovery sometimes requires great 
creative imagination, one is still left with Kant’s moral argument. This argument still 
resonates strongly with pressing contemporary concerns about who belongs in science, 
what role scientific education plays in a democratic society, and the potentially 
pernicious consequences of signaling that participation in the most prestigious sciences is 
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